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Pelzer: Unchartered Territory: Personal Jurisdiction in the Internet Age2

UNCHARTERED TERRITORY: PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNET AGE

I.

INTRODUCTON

As the Internet becomes more pervasive in the lives of Americans, the
legal issues arising from this new mode of communication and commerce are
endless. A South Carolina district court recently addressed the issue of the
exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporationbased primarily
on the maintenance of a web page in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut,L.L.C.'
The court held that the defendant, a nonresident corporation, was not subject
to either the general or specific personal jurisdiction of the court by merely
maintaining a web page and selling one electrode that allegedly infringed the
plaintiff's patent.2 Other federal and state courts have analyzed the issue of
personal jurisdiction based on the Internet in different ways,3 and the United
States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.
The Internet began in 1969 as ARPANET, an "experimental project" of
the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA).4 The Internet grew to fifty-

1. 34 F. Supp.2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999).
2. Id. at 329, 332-34. The patent involved covered "an improved electrode for use in
connection with plasma arc torches ... [that] are commonly utilized for cutting, welding and
surface treatment of metals." Id. at 326.
3. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,1264 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that
sending computersoftware, advertising on CompuServe's systemin the forum state, and sending
computer messages subjected the defendant to the court's jurisdiction); State v. Granite Gate
Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (D. Minn.1996) (finding that the
website alone was sufficient forjurisdiction). But see, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d 414,419 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that simply placing an infringing logo on its website was
not enough to subject the defendant to the court's jurisdiction); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.
King, 937 F. Supp. 295,301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the maintenance ofapassivewebsite
did not provide jurisdiction).
4. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,831 (E.D. Pa. 1996). ARPANET was primarily used
to link military computers and other computers involved in "defense-related research." Id. It
eventually grew to include universities, corporations, and people throughout the world. Id.
ARPANET came to be known as "DARPA Interet," and then simply the "Internet." Id. The
Internet was at first designed to allow computers to link together for communication without
"directhuman involvement or control, and with the automatic ability to re-route communications
if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise unavailable." Id.This linkage would
allow communications to continue in the event of a war or natural catastrophe; a network of
linked computers throughout various states would provide numerous paths for the
communication ifone of the linked computers was destroyed. Id. The communication would then
be re-routed automatically. Id. at 832. ARPANET eventually ceased to exist; however, it was
replaced with a similar system linking computers globally. Id. This new system is "today
commonly known as the Internet." Id.
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million users in the first four years it was available to the general public.5 It
continued to grow, reaching forty-million users in 1996, one hundred-million
users in 1998, and two hundred-million users by 1999.6 Some experts estimate
there will be one-billion users by 2005. 7 This explosion in the number of
Internet users will only add to the problem of determining personal jurisdiction
in cases where website information can be accessed anywhere in the world.
The advent of the Internet creates novel problems for the courts. In
particular:
The explosive rise of the Internet as a communications
medium has had tremendous implications for courts faced
with the application of personal jurisdiction doctrines. While
other technologies have allowed people to communicate
across great distances, no other medium has made such
communication so inexpensive, easy to use and rapid!
Thus, the nature of the Internet creates problems in applying the traditional
personal jurisdiction analysis. This Note explores what level of Interet activity
is enough for a South Carolina court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. Part II of this Note provides a background of the
Supreme Court cases that define the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
courts today, and it also provides a detailed description of the facts and the
court's holding in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut,L.L. C.9 Part III analyzes the
approach most likely to be taken by the South Carolina courts in light of the
ESAB Group decision.

The Internet is referred to analogously as "a highway, consisting of many streets leading
to places where a user can find information." Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles:
PersonalJurisdiction,the Internet,andthe Nature ofConstitutionalEvolution, 38 JuUMETRICs
J. 575, 581 (1998) (citing Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413,419
(D. Ariz. 1996)). Web pages are placed on the Internet that can be accessed by individuals
having the ability to connect to the network. Typically, one accesses the Internet via a computer
that is permanently connected to the Internet or through a personal computer and a modem.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832. People can pay a monthly fee to connect to the Internet by using an
Internet service provider, such as America Online or Mindspring, among countless others. Id.
at 833.
5. Howard B. Stravitz,PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace: Something More isRequired
on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 925 (1998) (citing SECRETARIAT
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 4).
[hereinafter COMMERCE DEP'TREP.]
6. Id. at 926 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997)).
7. Id. (citing COMMERCE DEP'T REP. at 7).
8. Jason H. Eaton, Annotation, Effect of Use, or Alleged Use, of Internet on Personal
Jurisdictionin, or Venue of FederalCourt Case, 155 A.L.R. FED. 535, 535 (1999).
9. 34 F. Supp.2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999)
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II. TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS

A. The Basics
In order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party, a court must comply
with the state's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The courts can exercise one of two types ofpersonal jurisdiction
over defendants: general or specific." A court may exercise specific
jurisdiction over a defendant when the lawsuit relates to the defendant's
activity within the forum state; a court will exercise general jurisdiction over
the lawsuit arises out of the defendant's activity outside of
a defendant when
2
the forum state.'
In order to exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant's
contacts with the forum state must be "continuous and systematic." 3 The
United States Supreme Court found the defendant's contacts in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. sufficient to give rise to general
jurisdiction.' 4 In contrast, the Court in HelicopterosNacionalesde Columbia,
5 found that the defendant's contacts with the forum state were
S.A. v. Hall"
insufficient to subject the defendant to general jurisdiction. 6 That particular
defendant bought helicopters, sent pilots to be trained, and maintained a bank
account in the forum state.' 7 The contacts in Helicopteroswere not found to be
continuous and systematic, though the defendant clearly had substantial
contacts with the forum state.'" Based on these cases, a defendant must have a
substantial presence in a forum state and probably remain there to be subject
to that forum's general jurisdiction.
The original basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction was the
territorial concept provided by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff.'9 The

10. The question of a court's jurisdiction under the long-arm statute or Due Process Clause
is integrated because "the South Carolina long-arm statute has been construed to extend
jurisdiction 'to the outer limits' of due process ...[t]he state law and due process analyses are
therefore identical." Federal Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 657 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989).
11. Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136 (1966) (clarifying the difference between
general and specific jurisdiction).
12. Id.
13. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-48 (1952).
14. Id. at 448. The president of Benguet Consolidated Mining maintained an office, kept
company files, held directors' meetings, and had bank accounts in Ohio. Id. at 447-48.
15. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
16. Id. at411.
17. Id.
18. Perkins,342 U.S. at 438.
19. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (holding that in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction,
a defendant must be within the state, waive jurisdiction, own property, or be a resident).
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Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington20 provided the framework for
the modem rule of personal jurisdiction-the "minimum contacts" test. The
Court stated that "due process requires only that... if [the defendant] be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. ' ' ' 2' The current application of the minimum
contacts test was introduced in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'
in which the Court held that a corporate defendant must purposefully avail
itself of the privileges and benefits of the forum state so that the defendant will
have notice that it may be sued in that forum.'
In addition to the purposeful availment test adopted by the court in WorldWide Volkswagen, a court must also analyze whether it is fair and reasonable
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 24The Court in BurgerKing
Corp. v. Rudzewicz stated: "Once it has been decided that a defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum State, these contacts
may be considered in light of other factors.. . ."

Those factors include

the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, the interstatejudicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.26
These factors can shift the scale to either side. If a defendant has
purposefully availedherselfofthe privileges and benefits of a forum, she "must
present a compelling case" that the presence of some other considerations
would render jurisdiction unreasonable.27
An exception to the minimum contacts rule exists in the case of torts when
the harm occurs in the forum, but the tort was committed outside of the forum.
2 8 the Court found that California
In Calder v. Jones,
courts had personal

20. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
22. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
23. Id. at 297 (citation omitted).
24. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
27. Id. For example, in Asahi MetalIndus. Co. v. SuperiorCourt, the Court found that the
"fairness factors weighed against the exercise of personal jurisdiction." 480 U.S. 102, 114
(1987). The plaintiff was injured on a motorcycle when the tire valve exploded that Asahi had
made. Id. at 105-06.
28. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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jurisdiction over two defendants that were both residents of Florida.29 The
Court noted that "California is the focal point both of the story and of the hann
suffered."3 ° The defendants in Calder aimed their conduct at California and
knew that the "effects" of their conduct would be felt in California. 31 Calder
demonstrates how nonresident defendants may be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the forum where the consequences of their torts occur, and the
defendants should have known that the injury would occur in the forum state.
B. PersonalJurisdictionBased on the Internet
Lower state and federal courts disagree as to what degree of Internet
activity is sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The
court in Weber v. Jolly Hotels2 explained the three categories of lower court
decisions. The first category involves "cases where defendants actively do
' The courts
business on the Internet."33
usually find that personal jurisdiction
exists in these cases due to contracts made between the residents and the
defendants.34 The second category involves "situations where a user can
exchange information with the host computer., 35 There "the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of information that occurs on
the website., 36 The third category involves "passive Websites; i.e., sites that
' In those
merely provide information or advertisements to users."37
cases courts
usually do not find personal jurisdiction. 38 While the preceding analyses have
been considered continuously in traditional contexts, the Internet presents
specific new problems.
1. Courts FindingForPersonalJurisdiction
The courts that generally find the defendant's Internet contacts sufficient
to confer personal jurisdiction base their decisions on additional contacts or

29. Id. at 789.
30. Id.
31. Id. 784-86, 789. While in Florida, the defendants wrote and edited the allegedly
libelous article for publication in a national magazine whose largest circulation included
California. Shirley Jones, the plaintiff and subject of the article, was a professional entertainer
living and working in California. Id.
32. 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997).
33. Id. at 333.
34. Id. at 333 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1996)).
35. Id.
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. Id.
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injuries occurring in the forums due to intentional torts.39 However, at least one

court has found that the maintenance of a website alone confers personal
jurisdiction.'
In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,4' the Sixth Circuit held that the
defendant, Patterson, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.42
CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action asking the district court to
find that CompuServe had not infringed the defendant's trademark.43 Patterson
was domiciled in Texas.' CompuServe, a computer information service
provider, had its corporate headquarters in Ohio.45 Patterson subscribed to
CompuServe's on-line service and used it to distribute his software to third
parties." The court described the defendant's contacts with CompuServe:
He [defendant] subscribed to CompuServe, and then he
entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement when he
loaded his software onto the CompuServe system for others
to use and, perhaps, purchase ....
Then, he repeatedly sent
his computer software, via electronic links, to the
CompuServe system in Ohio, and he advertised that software
on the CompuServe system. Moreover, he initiated the events
that led to the filing of this suit by making demands of
CompuServe via electronic and regular mail messages.47
Patterson purposefully availed himself of the privileges and benefits of
doing business in Ohio by using Compuserve to distribute his products, making
contracts governed by Ohio law, and continuing to contact the Ohio office by
electronic and regular mail while Compuserve was allegedly infringing his
trademark.48 The court also found that the lawsuit was a result of the
defendant's Internet activities in Ohio because Patterson marketed his software
there.49 Therefore, any violation of the alleged trademarks or trade-names
infringement had to have occurred "at least in part, in Ohio. 5 °

39. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(upholding specific jurisdiction for trademark infringement in California when Illinois resident
directed his business activities at that forum).
40. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (D.
Minn. 1996).
41. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
42. Id. at 1268.
43. Id. at 1257.
44. Id. at 1260.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1264, 1266.
47. Id. at 1264.
48. Id. at 1266.
49. Id. at 1267.
50. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit found the non-Internet contacts to be important in
deciding that Patterson had purposefully availed himself of services in Ohio.
Because his contacts were far more extensive than merely posting a website,
these additional contacts combined with the Internet activities led the court to
find that personal jurisdiction was proper."s
In Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,2 the court found the defendant
subject to personal jurisdiction in a trademark infringement case." The
plaintiff, Heroes, Inc., was a charitable organization in Washington, D.C. The
defendant was a charitable organization in New York. 4 Both the plaintiff and
the defendant were organized to help the survivors of police officers and
firemen killed in the line of duty.'5 The defendant advertised in The
Washington Post and maintained a website. s The defendant's newspaper ad
listed a toll-free telephone number to call to make donations. 57 The court
described this advertisement as "a purposeful action of the defendant" aimed
at the forum state.58 The defendant's website included this toll-free telephone
number and the allegedly infringing trademarked logo.59 The court found that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper due to the local newspaper
advertisement and the website solicitations, but stated that it was unnecessary
to decide if the website alone would be enough.60
In Panavision International,L.P. v. Toeppen,6' a district court found
personal jurisdiction in California when the defendant committed an intentional
tort, resulting in harmful effects in California.62 The plaintiff, Panavision, was
a Delaware limited partnership, and its principal place of business was in Los
Angeles, California. 63 The defendant, Dennis Toeppen, resided in llinois." The
defendant knowingly registered for a domain name that infringed a trademark
65
held by Panavision and intended to interfere with Panavision's business.
However, "[a]t no time did Toeppen use the 'Panavision.com' name in
connection with the sale of any goods or services."" Toeppen prevented

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1268.
958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3, 5.
Id. at 5.
938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 618.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Id. at619.
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Panavision from using its trademarked name for its website because he had
already registered for that domain name.67 He demanded money from
Panavision to give up the registered domain name.68
The court used the "effects test," of Calder v. Jones,69 to decide if
purposeful availment existed in this tort case. 70 Toeppen directed his activities
at the forum state, California, by intentionally registering a domain name,
knowing that Panavision would be injured in California.7' The injury occurred
in the forum state, which Toeppen should have easily foreseen because
California is where Panavision primarily does business.72 Toeppen's Internet
contacts were minimal in this case because he merely posted a website.
However, Toeppen registered a trademarked domain name and attempted to
sell it to the owner of the trademark. Thus, the court found personal
jurisdiction.73
Although the exception to the general rule, at least one court has found
personal jurisdiction based on a passive website when the company merely
maintained a web page with ad.ertisements. In State v. GraniteGate Resorts,
Inc.,74the Minnesota Attorney General sued Granite Gate Resorts for deceptive
trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud.7 5 Granite Gate is an
Internet service provider, and it has a website advertising gambling services.76
The district court held the defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in
Minnesota.77 The court focused on the nature of the Internet advertising to find
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, stating "[o]nce the Defendants place
an advertisement on the Internet, that advertisement is available 24 hours a day,
seven days a week, 365 days a year to any Internet user until the Defendants
take it off the Internet."' The court held the advertisements should have been
enough to put the defendant on notice that it may be sued in Minnesota, and
thus, the defendant had met the purposeful availment requirements for personal
jurisdiction through its activities that were directed at Minnesota.79 This view
is only followed by a minority of courts. The flaw with this reasoning is that

67. Id.
68. Id. He had previously registered domain names of other well-known companies with
the intent of selling the domain names to those companies. Id.
69. Id. at 621 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (finding that personal
jurisdiction is proper when the effects ofaperson's conduct cause an injury in the forum state)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (D. Minn. 1996).
75. Id. at*1.
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id. at*10.
78. Id. at *6.
79. Id. at*11.
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under this rule, Granite Gate Resorts could be sued anywhere that a person can
access its website-virtually anywhere in the world. This rule would allow for
an interpretation that would virtually destroy the traditional requirements for
a court's exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant.
2. Courts FindingAgainst PersonalJurisdiction
InBensusanRestaurantCorp.v. King,"0 a district court in New York found
no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The plaintiff, Bensusan Restaurant
Corporation, sued King in New York for allegedly infringing its trademark,
"The Blue Note."'" King resided in Columbia, Missouri, where he "own[ed]
andoperate[d] a'small club'... called 'The Blue Note."' 82 The plaintiff, aNew
York corporation, founded ajazz club inNew York City, also called"The Blue
Note," and owned other jazz clubs around the world by the same name. 3
84
King created a website to advertise his club to Missouri residents.
Anyone could access the website regardless of location. He posted information
about his club on the website, including the dates when various bands would
be playing, locations to purchase tickets, and a telephone number for charging
tickets."5 King would not mail tickets ordered by telephone, but required that
they be picked up in Missouri.16 The website had a logo that allegedly infringed
the plaintiff's trademark.'
The court found that King did not meet the purposeful availment
requirements.8 8 "King has done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the
benefits of New York. King, like numerous others, simply created a Website
and permitted anyone who could find it to access it." 9 This reasoning is
consistent with the holdings of a majority of courts that have analyzed the issue
of personal jurisdiction in which the defendant's only contact is a passive
website. 90 Otherwise, anyone with a website would be subject to personal
jurisdiction anywhere the website could be accessed.
In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,91 the Ninth Circuit also held the
defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Arizona by merely placing

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.
See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997).
130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
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an allegedly infringing logo on its web page.' The plaintiff was incorporated
in Arizona, and the defendant was a Florida corporation.93 The defendant's
contacts with Arizona were minimal; it merely posted an "essentially passive
home page on the web, using the name 'Cybersell."'"4 The court found that the
defendant did not direct its activities at the forum state by maintaining a passive
website.9 This court's holding is consistent with a majority of courts that find
that a defendant must do something more than maintain a passive website to be
subject to a forum court's personal jurisdiction.
C. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C. 96
In ESAB Group a federal district court held that maintaining a web page
that could be viewed in South Carolina did not subject the nonresident
defendant corporation to personal jurisdiction in that state.97 The plaintiff's
principal place of business was in Florence, South Carolina, but it was
incorporated in Delaware. 98 ESAB developed, manufactured, and sold welding
and cutting equipment. 99 The defendant, Centricut, was incorporated in New
Hampshire with its principal place of business in West Lebanon, New
Hampshire." Centricut manufactured and sold replacement parts for welding
and cutting equipment.' ° Additionally, Centricut sold replacement parts for
machines made by ESAB. °2
ESAB owned a patent that "cover[ed] an improved electrode for use in
connection with plasma arc torches."' 3 These torches are commonly used for
"cutting, welding, and surface treatment of metals.""' The electrode is
"surrounded by a layer of oxidizing gas" that is supposed to increase the
"service life [of the torch by] ... preventing the typical rapid oxidation of a
particular copper component of the electrode."'0 5 ESAB accused Centricut of

92. Id. at 415.
93. Id.
94. Id. at419.
95. Id. ("In short, Cybersell FL has done no act and has consummated no transaction, nor
has it performed any act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities, in Arizona, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of Arizona law.")
96. 34 F. Supp.2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999).
97. Id. at 331.
98. Id. at 326.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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patent infringement for selling electrodes covered by the patent. 10 6 In its
defense, Centricut claimed the allegedly infringing electrodes had not yet been
sold or offered for sale.0 7 However, the court found the electrodes were offered
for sale in Centricut's Internet catalog. 0 8
A month after ESAB filed its summons and complaint, Superior Machine
Company bought the allegedly infringing electrode. 9 It did so through an
unsolicited telephone call to Centricut after viewing the Internet catalog.' This
was the first and only time that Superior had done business with Centricut. The
same day the order was placed, Centricut shipped the electrodes."' Two days
12
after Superior's order, ESAB served Centricut with the complaint
Centricut transacted its business entirely by mail, telephone, and
facsimile."' Less than one percent of its customers were in South Carolina." 4
Centricut "use[ed] account managers, sales personnel, outside regional
representatives and telemarketers to contact customers and potential
customers. ...

"' '"Centricut's sales staffmade

"numerous contacts" with South

Carolina residents." 6 Centricut had a website on the Internet that included

product information and allowed customers to place orders." 7 To place an

order, customers were first required to set up an account by telephoning
Centricut to get a customer ID and password." 8 Centricut employees had only
been to South Carolina once for a previous lawsuit."9 Also, Centricut did not
have any employees in South Carolina. 20 The court found that Centricut's
contacts were not sufficient to subject it to general or specific personal
jurisdiction.' 2 ' Centricut was somewhere between the interactive sites, where
personal jurisdiction generally exists, and the passive sites, where personal
jurisdiction generally does not exist. 1 The court concluded that Centricut did
not aim its commercial activities specifically at South Carolina." Due to the

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at330.
Id.
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proximity of the summons and complaint to Superior's order, the court
evidently agreed with the defendant that ESAB asked Superior to place an
order for the electrodes; thus, the court disregarded
that sale because the order
24
was placed to manufacture jurisdiction.1
ESAB's argument rested on the fact that South Carolina customers could
place orders over Centricut's website.'" The court found no merit in ESAB's
argument that Centricut's website was an offer to sell. 26 It went on to add that
even if the website constituted an offer to sell, ESAB failed to present any
evidence that the offers were made in South Carolina by a customer actually
visiting the website. 27 Centricut's contacts were minimal, as the website was
the main contact considered in the specificjurisdiction analysis.' Because the
court had already decided that Centricut's contacts were not "continuous and
systematic" to support
the exercise of general jurisdiction, no personal
29
jurisdiction existed.
Ill. ANALYSIS
It is unclear what approach South Carolina will follow to determine the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on the
presence of Internet contacts. The ESAB Group court declined to follow a
minority ofjurisdictions that have held that the presence of a passive website
can confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. It appears that
South Carolina will follow the majority of courts and find jurisdiction only
when additional contacts are present beyond the passive website. South
Carolina has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens have the ability to seek
relief when they are injured by nonresidents by ensuring that South Carolina
residents can bring their suits in the state's courts.
Legal scholars have suggested different approaches to the problem.
Professor Howard B. Stravitz suggests that courts should focus on the fairness
factors in the BurgerKing case and require a very low threshold to satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement. 31 Under this approach, it would merely take
anything more than a passive website to satisfy the minimum contacts

124. Id. at 333.
125. Id. at 331 ("Plaintiff relies solely on the national and international nature of the
Internet to demonstrate that Centricut's website had the potential to reach and solicit South
Carolina residents.").
126. Id. at 333.
127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 329.
130. See Stravitz, supra note 5, at 940.
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requirement.' This method is based on evaluating the fairness to a defendant
in having to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction.'32 Professor Martin H. Redish
suggests that the purposeful availment test is outdated, and the Supreme Court
needs to formulate a more modem basis for the exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction
based on the Intemet." However, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
will abandon the purposeful availment test to develop a new standard simply
for the Internet.
As indicated in ESAB Group, South Carolina will likely require additional
contacts for personal jurisdiction in Internet cases. Because the ESAB Group
court merely held that the maintenance of a passive website alone is not enough
to confer personal jurisdiction, the question of what degree of content is
sufficient to trigger personal jurisdiction is an open one. In essence, the ESAB
Group decision does not give any practical guidance as to what will be
sufficient to constitute purposeful availment in South Carolina with regard to
use of the Internet. As demonstrated by a majority of courts, the most logical
solution for attorneys trying to predict a South Carolina court's holding is to
look at the contacts found in other jurisdictions, in addition to the websites
other jurisdictions have found sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.
IV CONCLUSION

The problem of purposeful availment by Internet use looms large as the
Internet becomes more pervasive and widespread. As of yet, there is no clear
approach to the problem in ascertaining personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. Websites can be seen by anyone with access to the Internet,
anywhere in the world. However, nonresident defendants surely cannot be
subject to nationwide jurisdiction and possibly worldwide jurisdiction simply
by posting a website. Clearly, nonresident defendants canbe subject to personal
jurisdiction in South Carolina through intentional torts directed at South
Carolina where the injury occurs in the state. That rule will only apply in a
limited number of cases, but it is not a solution to the overall problem.
Felix C. Pelzer

131. Id. ("Shifting emphasis to the second-branch convenience factors will allow
jurisdiction to be asserted unless the chosen forum is fundamentally unfair.")
132. Id.
133. See Redish, supranote 4, at 601. ("IT]he technological impact of the Internet in many
cases renders purposeful availment an all but meaningless concept from the perspective of outof-state defendant activity, and imposes an unacceptably high barrier to the interests of both instate plaintiffs and the states themselves.")
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